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EASTERN EXIT
Rescue “. . . From the Sea”
Gary J. Ohls
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps spentconsiderable time and energy attempting to define their roles in a new secu-
rity environment created by the end of the Cold War. The decline of Soviet
power, accentuated by large cutbacks in military spending and a withdrawal
from Central and Eastern Europe, left the United States without a peer competi-
tor—politically, diplomatically, or militarily—on the world scene.1 As ideas and
concepts churned throughout the Department of Defense, the Navy and Marine
Corps issued a series of strategic and operational concept papers that defined
the new security environment along with the roles and missions of the sea ser-
vices. The Department of the Navy issued the most relevant of these documents
during the first half of the 1990s.
Perhaps the most important paper to address post–Cold War security con-
cerns was the September 1992 document entitled “. . . From the Sea: Preparing
the Naval Service for the 21st Century.” This concept paper clearly identified a
new direction for the naval services and defined a combined vision for the
Navy and Marine Corps.2 Unlike some earlier efforts, “. . . From the Sea” be-
came widely influential within the naval services and throughout the Depart-
ment of Defense.3 Among other things, it expressed
the expeditionary nature of the post–Cold War mis-
sion for both the Navy and Marine Corps while cap-
turing the strategic temper of the time. It also
reiterated the uncertainty that existed within the op-
erational environment as leaders attempted to
recalibrate their thinking.4 But if uncertainty existed
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at the operational and strategic levels in the minds of some, “. . . From the Sea”
clarified the direction for the sea services during that period and for the
near-term future. It unequivocally directed the Navy and Marine Corps team to
provide the nation with “Naval Expeditionary Forces—Shaped for Joint Opera-
tions—Operating Forward from the Sea—Tailored for National Needs.” Its stra-
tegic message emphasized the shift “away from open-ocean warfighting on the
sea toward joint operations from the sea.”5 The word “from” constituted the key
term in this new naval concept statement and thereby elevated the role of the
U.S. Marine Corps within the larger naval mission of the time.6 Yet even as naval
thinkers codified in their policy statements the concepts of littoral-focused ex-
peditionary warfare and sea-based forward presence, the Navy and Marine
Corps embodied these concepts through numerous incursions in Somalia, on
the Horn of Africa.7
Among other things, “. . . From the Sea” emphasized the importance of unob-
trusive forward presence—as opposed to the forward defense concept of the
Cold War—and the flexibility of sea-based forces. That meant that naval expedi-
tionary forces could not only come from the sea and return to the sea but also be
sustained from the sea. This approach offers policy flexibility, because sea-based
expeditionary forces can project either power or assistance ashore yet do not en-
croach on the sovereignty of nations while at sea.8 Once ashore, naval expedi-
tionary forces present a relatively small “footprint,” because their support is
based at sea, thereby reducing exposure, vulnerability, and host-nation resent-
ment.9 By concentrating on the littoral regions of the world and recognizing the
importance of power projection and maneuver from the sea, “. . . From the Sea”
reinforced the importance of the Navy and Marine Corps team as an integrated
element of sea power.10
In January 1996, the Marine Corps issued a document that augmented “. . . From
the Sea”; it was entitled “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” or, as it became
known, simply OMFTS. Although the paper was published after the last Ameri-
can incursion in Somalia, its ideas and concepts expressed were greatly influ-
enced by those operations as well as other actions occurring in the early 1990s.11
Many officers within the Navy and Marine Corps contributed to the develop-
ment of these various concepts, but one of the earliest inputs to OMFTS resulted
from the experiences of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., during Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and in the evacuation of the American em-
bassy in Mogadishu, Somalia—Operation EASTERN EXIT. In a 1991 memoran-
dum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Jenkins emphasized that future
operations—either combat or humanitarian—should involve very rapid,
long-range insertions at points along the coastline where gaps in coastal de-
fenses would permit the avoidance of enemy strength. Speed of maneuver and
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flexibility in the location of the launching point (that is, distance from the shore-
line) constituted key elements of Jenkins’s precepts. Although this approach
would ultimately require development of new equipment, it also involved a new
application of existing systems and a change in the mind-sets of leaders. He sug-
gested the concept be named “Maneuver from the Sea,” or perhaps “Maneuver
War from the Sea.”12 Five years later, the Commandant published the OMFTS
concept paper, which included all of Jenkins’s ideas. The concepts of “. . . From
the Sea”and OMFTS are clearly demonstrated in the series of incursions into So-
malia early in the last decade of the twentieth century. The first of those events—
known as Operation EASTERN EXIT—proved to be as dramatic as it was
proficient.
During December 1990 the eyes of the world and the attention of its leaders fo-
cused on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. For months, the United States
had been building a strong naval and military presence throughout the region in
response to Saddam Hussein’s 2 August 1990 attack upon and occupation of Ku-
wait. Under the leadership of vice admirals Henry H. Mauz, Jr., and Stanley R.
Arthur, NAVCENT (that is, the naval component of U.S. Central Command)
had created a force in excess of a hundred ships, the largest American fleet as-
sembled since World War II.13 The buildup had begun under Admiral Mauz and
continued with Arthur, who assumed command of NAVCENT just six weeks be-
fore the 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Despite
that cutoff date, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank Kelso II,
did not consider war to liberate Kuwait as imminent and chose to implement the
already-planned change of command at NAVCENT on 1 December 1990. Gen-
eral H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Command, con-
sidered Arthur one of the most aggressive admirals he knew and interposed no
objection. Additionally, Arthur had considerable experience within this opera-
tional area, having created the post of NAVCENT back in 1983.14
When Arthur took command of NAVCENT in December 1990, Rear Admiral
John B. “Bat” LaPlante commanded its amphibious element, which would ulti-
mately consist of thirty-one ships, loaded with two Marine expeditionary brigades
(MEBs) and one special-operations-capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU
[SOC])—roughly seventeen thousand Marines. LaPlante’s Marine counterpart,
Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., commanded both the 4th MEB and, as senior
Marine officer afloat, the overall Marine landing force, which ultimately included
5th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC).15 In the language of doctrine, LaPlante served as
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Jenkins as Commander, Land-
ing Force (CLF).16 (The Marine element afloat under Jenkins’s command should
not be confused with the I Marine Expeditionary Force—I MEF, pronounced
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“One MEF”—ashore, under Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer; it had a differ-
ent mission and reporting structure.)17 The primary role of LaPlante as Com-
mander, Task Force (CTF) 156, the amphibious task force, and Jenkins as CTF 158,
commanding the embarked Marines, involved preparing for an amphibious as-
sault against Iraqi positions on the Kuwaiti coastline in the upcoming Operation
DESERT STORM. This required planning and operational rehearsals, the capstone
event being a major landing exercise in Oman during late January 1991, desig-
nated SEA SOLDIER IV. This rehearsal included the entire force under LaPlante and
Jenkins, and it would constitute the largest amphibious landing since Exercise
STEEL PIKE in October 1964.18
Schwarzkopf often impressed on Arthur the importance of convincing Iraqi
commanders that an amphibious landing would be part of any future war for
Kuwait.19 Although the threatened landing was intended primarily as a decep-
tion, LaPlante and Jenkins needed to prepare for an actual assault landing
should the course of war so dictate. With proper training, including large-scale
rehearsals, the amphibious force would be capable of both deception and com-
bat.20 The importance of this exercise, coupled with firm arrangements coordi-
nated through Omani and U.S. State Department representatives, caused both
Arthur and LaPlante to consider the exercise dates for SEA SOLDIER IV as fixed
and definite. They also believed that the entire amphibious force must partici-
pate in the landing, to achieve NAVCENT training objectives.21 The diversion of
ships or Marines for any cause—no matter how important—would disrupt their
planning and degrade combat readiness. This issue would influence the think-
ing of Arthur and LaPlante when conditions within Somalia necessitated an
American rescue mission in the days just preceding DESERT STORM.22
As events eventually played out, LaPlante and Jenkins did not conduct an am-
phibious landing during DESERT STORM. But as a deception, their operations
constituted the most successful undertaking since the Second World War.23 The
major reasons for its success include the degree to which the Navy and Marine
Corps prepared for the landing, especially the SEA SOLDIER IV rehearsal. Leaders
at Central Command also provided the American news media opportunities to
observe and report on the amphibious preparations. The film footage taken dur-
ing their visits to the fleet showed up on television newscasts throughout the pe-
riod leading up to the DESERT STORM ground attack. The fact that only the
highest levels of command knew the amphibious landing was actually a ruse
contributed as well. Even Jenkins—the senior Marine officer afloat—was not in-
formed, although he had suspicions for various reasons, including the constant
press coverage. The deception tied down five or six divisions (depending on the
time frame) along the coast of Kuwait and drew an Iraqi reaction every time
LaPlante and Jenkins made a move in the Persian Gulf.24 The key commanders
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believed that the hard training by the amphibious force during Operation
DESERT SHIELD—capped by SEA SOLDIER IV—established the credibility that
fooled Iraqi leaders.25
Amphibious Squadron 6 (PHIBRON 6), commanded by Captain Alan B.
Moser, had been among the first naval forces to sail to the Arabian Sea after Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. Moser’s squadron consisted of five ships loaded with some
2,100 Marines from units of Jenkins’s 4th MEB. By January 1991 they had been
at sea over four months, conducting training and preparing for the looming bat-
tle with Iraq. Prior to deploying for DESERT SHIELD, Moser’s squadron had spent
only a few weeks in port at Norfolk, Virginia, following a routine Mediterranean
deployment.26 PHIBRON 6 was typical of the Navy and Marine forces that de-
ployed for DESERT SHIELD, in that its elements responded to the crisis on very
short notice and in various stages of training.27 But during their time at sea the
sailors and Marines of the amphibious task force conducted a series of training
exercises, including IMMINENT THUNDER and SEA SOLDIER I–III, and achieved a
high level of preparedness.28 Nevertheless, they urgently needed the training of
SEA SOLDIER IV to ensure their ability to conduct a large-scale landing if re-
quired.29 SEA SOLDIER IV was particularly critical because Jenkins’s landing
force consisted of three distinct elements (4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU
[SOC]) that did not have a common higher headquarters. It amounted to a com-
mand roughly the size of a small Marine expeditionary force but without a MEF
headquarters to structure and direct it.30 Therefore, when LaPlante and Moser
received the warning order to prepare for an amphibious evacuation of the U.S.
embassy in Mogadishu, their immediate concern involved the new operation’s
impact on this critical exercise and subsequent combat landings should such ac-
tion become necessary during the impending war with Iraq.31
On 1 January 1991, as LaPlante increased the tempo of war preparation,
NAVCENT received an alert message indicating that civil war and internal clan
conflict in Somalia might endanger U.S. citizens and require a military response.32
This warning did not surprise Arthur, who had been monitoring message traffic
from Somalia and had noticed in it an increasing sense of urgency.33 The follow-
ing day, Ambassador James K. Bishop in Mogadishu requested military assis-
tance to evacuate Americans from the U.S. embassy there due to the chaotic
violence occurring throughout the city.34 The Pentagon immediately directed
Central Command to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) to
rescue American citizens from Somalia.35 Arthur tasked LaPlante with planning
the NEO and proposing a contingency task force to execute the mission.
LaPlante summoned Moser to a meeting on his flagship, the amphibious assault
ship USS Nassau (LHA 4), then in port at Dubai. Having limited knowledge of
conditions “on the ground” in Mogadishu, the two commanders envisioned a
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force capable of performing missions across the entire range of amphibious op-
erations, including both surface and air actions. (Only later in the planning pro-
cess did it become obvious that a surface evacuation across the beach would not
be practicable.) In addition to identifying the necessary amphibious ships and
Marines for the mission, they proposed the assignment of two destroyers, which
could provide fire support and electronic warfare capability, should that become
necessary.36
Despite the irregular nature of the fighting in Mogadishu, amphibious com-
manders were seriously concerned that sophisticated weapons systems might be
present, particularly within the government faction. During much of the 1970s
Somalia had been a Cold War ally of the Soviet Union and had received both
modern weapons and advisers.37 That relationship had soured and the Soviets
had eventually withdrawn their support, but American commanders needed to
consider the possibility that Cold War weapons—especially surface-to-air mis-
siles and electronic warfare equipment—remained in Somali hands and could
threaten their rescue mission.38 LaPlante therefore recommended a seven-ship
response force—four amphibious ships, two destroyer escorts, and one oiler—
to conduct the operation, under Moser’s command.39
Concurrent with LaPlante’s planning, Jenkins considered issues relating to
the landing force that would conduct the operation on the ground. He tasked
Colonel James J. Doyle, Jr., the commander of Brigade Service Support Group 4,
then located on the amphibious dock transport USS Trenton (LPD 14), to serve
as commander of the mission to Mogadishu. Jenkins instructed Doyle to create a
special-purpose command element—designated 4th MEB, Detachment 1—
aboard the amphibious assault ship (and helicopter carrier) USS Guam (LPH 9)
to plan the operation and exercise command and control during its execution.
Doyle relocated from Trenton to Guam, taking several key members of his Bri-
gade Service Support Group 4 staff, which he integrated with officers from vari-
ous headquarters elements to create an even more experienced, professional,
and eager group.40 Equally important, Guam’s commanding officer, Captain
Charles R. Saffell, Jr., and the Marine commander of troops aboard Guam, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer, along with their staffs, began planning for the
operation even before the arrival of Doyle and Moser. Once the two command-
ers arrived on Guam with their own skeleton staffs, they could take advantage of
work already advanced. The staff planning and subsequent execution thus
amounted to a collaborative effort among Navy and Marine officers who knew
their jobs, knew their doctrine and procedures, and in many cases knew each
other personally.41
Arthur recognized the importance of rescuing Americans in Somalia but did
not want to send seven ships to do the job. He viewed the action as strictly an
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extraction operation, to get people
out of and away from Mogadishu.
There would be no ongoing oper-
ation ashore in Somalia or afloat
in the Indian Ocean. At least, Ar-
thur hoped to limit the mission to
that role, because he needed all
his ships for DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM—including the
critical SEA SOLDIER IV workup.
Once he sent ships out of the op-
erational area, Arthur and his
commanders knew, getting them
back could be a problem. For ex-
ample, the evacuees coming out
of Mogadishu would require transfer to a safe port. Could he bring them back to
Oman, or would he have to send his ships to other locations—such as Mombasa,
Kenya, or the island of Diego Garcia—even farther from the scene of action? Ad-
ditionally, commanders throughout the fleet remembered the 1990 evacuation
of Americans in Liberia, Opera-
tion SHARP EDGE, which had
lasted five months and ultimately
involved four ships and some
2,100 Marines. Not wanting to
degrade combat readiness in the
Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf any
more than absolutely necessary,
Arthur decided that a two-ship
amphibious task force with the right mix of helicopters and Marines could ac-
complish the mission in Somalia.42 Two of the amphibious ships at anchorage
near Masirah, Oman—Guam and Trenton—not only had the necessary configu-
ration but also were located nearest to the Horn of Africa.43 LaPlante assigned
these two ships to conduct the operation and sent Moser—whom he held in
high esteem and hated to lose—to act as commodore of the amphibious task
force.44
The need for this rescue mission to Somalia had resulted from the breakdown of
governmental control and subsequent social strife throughout that nation, espe-
cially in the capital city of Mogadishu.45 By 1989, twenty years of dictatorial rule
under President Mahammad Siad Barre had produced three substantial
O H L S 1 3 1
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clan-based rebel factions, including the Somali National Movement (SNM), ac-
tive in northern Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), primarily in
the south; and the United Somali Congress (USC), focused in Mogadishu and
central Somalia.46 Over the next two years, political turmoil became increasingly
fierce, spawning clan warfare and rampant criminal activity. As Siad Barre lost
grip on power in Somalia, the rebel elements further broke down into subclan
conflict, increasing the bloodshed and undercutting efforts at unification.47 In
early December 1990, conditions had deteriorated to the point that Ambassador
Bishop evacuated nonessential embassy personnel and called on all American
citizens to leave the country. He even sent his wife and daughter out of Somalia,
to underscore the seriousness of the situation and encourage others to depart.48
Most foreign missions in Mogadishu took similar actions as the fighting in-
creased and social disintegration worsened. Although not specifically targeted
by any Somali faction, the U.S. embassy and its staff often became the victims of
gunfire and random acts of violence.49
After meeting with the Somali president and prime minister in the closing
days of December, Bishop concluded that the government had neither a plan nor
the ability to control the growing crisis. As carnage and lawlessness spread, the
need to evacuate remaining Americans increased, while the ability to do so de-
creased. The situation constituted the kind of “chaos in the littorals” that the
OMFTS concept paper would later decry as a war of “all against all.”50 In re-
sponse, Bishop moved Americans into relatively secure areas in and around the
embassy, while Italian officials made a fruitless effort to arrange a cease-fire
among the factions. With the failure of this effort, the American ambassador re-
alized his options were narrowing, and on 2 January he requested military assis-
tance to evacuate the U.S. embassy. On the following day Bishop perceived that
conditions were so bad that only a helicopter-borne evacuation had any chance
of rescuing the remaining Americans from Mogadishu.51 His urgent request for
help received immediate attention in Washington and set in motion the plan-
ning and execution of Operation EASTERN EXIT, which came to be considered by
many a model for this type of action.52
In response to the Pentagon’s execution order for EASTERN EXIT, officers at
Central Command deployed two C-130 and one AC-130 aircraft to Kenya and
ordered Guam and Trenton to set sail toward Mogadishu. In reality, commanders
at Central Command had already initiated these actions, in anticipation of or-
ders from the National Command Authority. After meeting with LaPlante
aboard Nassau, Moser took five members of his squadron staff and four officers
from Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 to Masirah in a P-3 Orion and then
helicoptered aboard Guam.53 Doyle had already arrived, and the two com-
manders collocated their operations center in the ship’s Supporting Arms
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Control Center. Although this arrangement appears somewhat ad hoc, creat-
ing special-purpose organizations for various expeditionary actions is normal
for Marine and naval officers of the amphibious service.54 The officers assem-
bling on Guam to plan and execute this rescue mission had considerable experi-
ence in this type of operation, and many had worked together before.55 The
planning began immediately upon receipt of the warning order and continued
after the two ships departed Masirah just before midnight on 2 January 1991.56
With the amphibious force in motion, officers at Central Command and
NAVCENT continued to consider alternative methods for conducting the evac-
uation. In fact, various possibilities had been under consideration at all levels of
command from the beginning of the crisis, and it had not yet become clear that
only one option remained viable. Initially, the preferred course of action in-
volved sending aircraft with security detachments on board into the Mogadishu
airport and flying American evacuees out of the country. Several other foreign
missions had done exactly that during the last few days of December.57 But this
required a permissive environment, and leaders at Central Command came to
realize from Bishop’s messages that such conditions no longer existed.58 The em-
bassy could not even communicate with the Mogadishu airport to obtain per-
mission for landing evacuation aircraft, because the telephone lines were all
down. More important, the airport was nearly two miles from the U.S. embassy,
and Bishop did not believe Americans could move safely on the city streets, due
to the extreme violence. Central Command also considered the use of special
operations forces, going so far as to direct that six MH-53 Pave Low helicopters
with tanker support be prepared to conduct the evacuation.59 This option never
progressed beyond the initial concept, because the Pave Low helicopters were
preparing for the imminent launching of DESERT STORM.60 Additionally, the
special operations forces were heavily committed along the Iraqi border and in
the western desert looking for Scud missiles.61 It now became apparent that only
an amphibious evacuation by ship-based helicopters remained viable and of-
fered a prospect for success regardless of the situation on the ground.62
By 4 January, conditions had deteriorated so much that Bishop requested two
platoons of paratroopers be dropped to protect Americans until the amphibious
task force could arrive.63 Colonel Doyle and other commanders considered it a
bad idea, because the space available for a drop zone was so small that para-
troopers might be scattered outside the embassy. Such an operation also in-
creased the number of people requiring evacuation.64 More important, by the
time Bishop made his request events had outpaced its rationale: Moser’s task
force was nearing a position to launch its helicopters, sooner than Bishop had
expected, and the rescue team would likely arrive before paratroops could be
O H L S 1 3 3
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delivered.65 Fortunately for all concerned, Schwarzkopf refused to authorize the
paratroop drop.66
When Guam and Trenton originally received orders to sail, they were located
in the northern Arabian Sea off the coast of Masirah, Oman, approximately
1,500 miles from Mogadishu. Guam had a top speed of twenty-four knots,
whereas Trenton could make about eighteen knots maximum. There was no re-
quirement to keep the ships together, and initially Guam steamed at near maxi-
mum speed, outpacing Trenton. Saffell received orders to slow to a more
fuel-efficient speed, with which he complied. But as the situation in Mogadishu
became clear, the ship resumed its initial speed. Neither Moser nor Saffell was
concerned about fuel usage, because they had plenty on board and could replen-
ish in Mombasa if necessary.67 In any case, it had become essential that the ships
close the distance to Somalia as fast as possible and that imperative trumped fuel
economy.
Planning and conducting operations had become second nature to Moser,
Doyle, their staffs, the officers of the ships, and the embarked Marines. In addi-
tion, existing doctrine, standing operating procedures, and training in rapid
planning techniques greatly facilitated their effort and ensured the prompt issu-
ance of well conceived orders.68 The question of when to launch the rescue force
remained under discus-
sion, but Bishop’s anx-
ious messages forced the
issue into the forefront.
While Moser and Doyle
prepared for the evacua-
t i o n i n Mo g a d i s h u ,
LaPlante and Jenkins—
exhibiting high confi-
dence in their subordi-
nates—monitored events
from Nassau and contin-
ued preparation for SEA
SOLDIER IV, scheduled to
begin in Oman on 19 Jan-
uary 1991.69
In the early morning
hours of 5 January 1991,
two Marine Corps CH-
53E Super Stallion heli-
copters lifted a small
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amphibious force from Guam’s deck and headed for Mogadishu, 466 miles to
the southwest.70 It was now clearer than ever that only the helicopter-borne am-
phibious option offered any hope for saving the Americans in time.71 The
CH-53Es, because they were designed to conduct in-flight refueling, had a
long-range insertion capability; they remain today the only U.S. heavy-lift heli-
copters that can fly into an uncertain environment at such a long distance.72 Al-
though assigned to Trenton, these two helicopters cross-decked to Guam to load
the evacuation force and then launch for Mogadishu.73 The Super Stallions car-
ried a sixty-man force consisting of forty-seven Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd
Marines (an element of Jenkins’s 4th MEB), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Robert P. McAleer, and four Marines from Doyle’s headquarters elements. It
also included a nine-man Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team under Commander Ste-
phen R. Louma, USN.74 McAleer’s 1st Battalion had been the helicopter-borne
assault element of Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT-2), composed primarily of
the 2nd Marine Regiment.75 As such, McAleer’s Marines had become very profi-
cient in helicopter operations from the many exercises and rehearsals con-
ducted at sea. Additionally, their predeployment training at Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, had included noncombatant evacuation exercises.76
Doyle ordered McAleer to accompany his Marines into Mogadishu, while he
remained at sea, where he could keep close contact with Moser and have better
communications.77 In addition to assigning McAleer to command the Marines
and SEALs under Louma, Doyle appointed Lieutenant Colonel Willard D. Oats
as overall commander of the forward element.78 Oats would be the senior officer
on the ground in Mogadishu, working primarily with the ambassador after ar-
riving at the embassy. Major William N. Saunders served as the logistician for
the mission and specifically supervised the evacuation control center (ECC),
which would process evacuees and prepare them for departure.
Sending two lieutenant colonels, one Navy commander (Louma accompa-
nied the SEAL team), and a major in addition to the normal complement of offi-
cers and noncommissioned officers seems excessively top heavy. But Doyle
considered this “an unconventional operation with potentially extraordinary
consequences” and wanted a “few guys with gray hair” in the landing zone. Loss
of American life in the embassy at Mogadishu would distract the nation as it ap-
proached the critical point of war in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Doyle clearly
remembered the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and how it had constrained Ameri-
can action for 444 days. Either scenario could unhinge DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM planning, resulting in unthinkable consequences.79
Essentially, Doyle organized the NEO team in a Marine air-ground task
force structure, as illustrated in the figure below. In Doyle’s organizational
plan, Oats functioned as the senior officer ashore, although McAleer held the
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same rank and commanded most of the Marines. Fortunately, command is-
sues never became a problem, despite the large number of high-ranking offi-
cers ashore, because Oats and McAleer tended to be of one mind throughout
the operation.80 Additionally, Bishop clearly understood his role in the oper-
ation and remained firmly in control of events throughout.81 The ambassa-
dor had been involved in the evacuation at Monrovia, Liberia (Operation
SHARP EDGE), a few months earlier and EASTERN EXIT clearly benefited from
his experience.82
While evaluating alternate courses of action, Moser and Doyle considered
launching the helicopters directly from their initial positions in the northern
Arabian Sea, some 1,500 miles from the target area. They again considered it
when the ships reached a point 890 miles away, but ultimately, as noted above,
they launched the aircraft from a distance of 466 nautical miles.83 In addition to
Bishop’s distressed calls for help, a number of issues contributed to the decision
to send the helicopters at this juncture, including in-flight refueling require-
ments, the availability of tanker support, the arrival time over Mogadishu, and
the availability of AC-130 gunships to provide cover.84 Anticipating the need for
in-flight refueling, Arthur had earlier contacted U.S. Air Force representatives at
Central Command and learned that they could not provide tanker support, due
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to other commitments. He had then approached Major General Royal N. Moore,
commanding general of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and arranged for Marine
Corps KC-130 tankers to refuel the Super Stallions.85 This proved challenging
enough, as the 466-nautical-mile flight meant refueling twice, over open water
at night, by pilots who had not recently practiced the procedure.86 The first refu-
eling would enable the helicopters to arrive at Mogadishu, and it occurred at a
point that would allow the helicopters to return to Guam should the effort prove
unsuccessful. The second refueling provided sufficient fuel for locating the em-
bassy and ensuring that the outbound flight could clear the Somali coastline.87
In the event, aerial refueling proved difficult, for a variety of reasons. The lack
of night-vision capability in the KC-130 tankers (one pilot in each of the
CH-53Es wore night-vision goggles) made it difficult for their crews to see the
helicopters at the rendezvous point. It had been over a year since the helicopter
pilots practiced refueling, not having anticipated any such requirement during
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. They had even taken the refueling probes
off their aircraft, making it necessary to reinstall them prior to takeoff. Fortu-
nately, Captain Saffell was himself an aviator and was acutely attuned to the
problems and risks of nighttime refueling over an open ocean.88 He delayed the
helicopter launch until he saw the KC-130s on radar and then tracked both
groups to ensure a rendezvous.89 One helicopter experienced a fuel leak while re-
fueling, which the crew chief repaired in flight, but not before the Marines and
SEALs received a good dousing of gas. It appears that the air crew had not only
removed the probes but failed to service the equipment.90 The second refueling,
just fifty-three nautical miles from Mogadishu, went somewhat more smoothly
and provided enough fuel to locate the embassy and depart from Mogadishu. Yet
another refueling would be required during the flight back to Guam, which
proved successful though problematic.91
Another source of problems during the flight to Mogadishu was navigation,
because the Omega navigation system on the CH-53Es could not always acquire
the three land-based signals it needed. The part of the Indian Ocean in which the
task force operated had dead spaces, resulting in inconsistent fixes.92 As a result,
the pilots relied on dead reckoning (based on preflight calculations),
pathfinding support from the KC-130 refuelers, and positive control from the
ships while within radar range.93 When the Omega could obtain fixes, the pilots
used them as backups.
Launching beyond 466 miles would have multiplied the problems faced by
the pilots in conducting the long-range insertion due to the additional refueling
requirements and navigational complications. Conversely, waiting for a closer
departure point would very likely have proved disastrous for the embassy per-
sonnel, as local conditions continued to worsen. In retrospect, it seems that
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Moser, Doyle, and the planners of EASTERN EXIT aboard Guam calculated the
launch point just about right.94
After receiving the last inbound refueling and a final fix on their position
from the KC-130s, the helicopter pilots began their approach into the city. If
navigating across part of the Indian Ocean had been difficult, locating the em-
bassy proved equally vexing. The initial information available during the plan-
ning phase regarding the location and configuration of the compound proved to
be out of date and inaccurate.95 A Marine warrant officer who accompanied
Doyle from Trenton had served on the Marine security guard detachment in So-
malia several years earlier, and he pointed out that the embassy had moved in-
land from the position indicated on their maps and planning documents.96
Updated coordinates and an aerial photograph were received later in the plan-
ning process and proved helpful in identifying the new embassy location. They
also eliminated any residual consideration of landing over the beach with sur-
face forces, because the Marines would likely have had to fight their way across
Mogadishu, and American leaders wanted to avoid becoming involved in Soma-
lia’s civil war. Despite updated information, the embassy compound proved dif-
ficult to identity from the air, particularly at low altitude in the early morning
light.97 The pilots spent nearly twenty minutes flying over Mogadishu and even-
tually made a second approach from the sea before finding their objective.98
As the Super Stallions arrived over the U.S. embassy at approximately 0620 in
the morning of 5 January, the compound was receiving a large volume of gun-
fire, and some 150 Somalis with ladders had gathered at one of the embassy
walls.99 Flying low into the cantonment area, the helicopters scattered the assem-
bled miscreants and landed within the embassy grounds.100 The Marines disem-
barked and established a perimeter to defend the compound and protect
subsequent evacuations.101 The SEAL team assumed responsibility for protect-
ing the ambassador and reinforced the Marine security guard detachment (Ma-
rines permanently stationed at the embassy, as opposed to those arriving in
helicopters) protecting the chancery building.102
The two helicopters remained on the ground for approximately one hour, as
an Air Force AC-130 gunship loitered overhead to gather intelligence and offer
fire support if required. The Super Stallions took off for their return flight to
Guam—now some 350 miles away—with sixty-one evacuees, including all non-
official Americans in the compound; the ambassadors from Nigeria, Turkey, and
the United Arab Emirates; and the Omani chargé d’affaires.103 The original plan
called for the CH-53Es to return to Guam and bring a second echelon of Marines
into the embassy; Oats believed he needed another forty-four Marines to ensure
security and process the evacuees efficiently and effectively. But when the two
CH-53E helicopters departed with the evacuees, it would be a one-way trip.
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After another difficult refueling in route, the Sea Stallions landed on the deck of
Guam just under eight hours after their initial departure from the ship. They
would not return to Mogadishu with reinforcements but rather fly to Trenton,
where their role in the mission ended.104
Doyle did not perceive a direct threat against the evacuation force in
Mogadishu and, in conjunction with Moser, chose not to dispatch additional
Marines.105 Sending in more troops implied a longer operation and increased
the number of people needing evacuation from the embassy. Although it was a
risky call, events once again bore out Doyle’s judgment. Even had Doyle wanted
to insert the additional Marines, he would not have been able to do so with the
CH-53Es, because their crews were exhausted from the wearing flight in and out
of Mogadishu and not yet capable of another demanding mission. With the
Super Stallions back on Trenton, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters stationed
on board Guam would carry out subsequent evacuations, once the ships
brought them within range of the embassy.106
Meanwhile, Marines and embassy employees in Mogadishu prepared for subse-
quent evacuations, although the shortage of staff to operate the ECC severely hin-
dered the process. With conditions worsening in the city, security remained
marginal despite the arrival of the Navy and Marine Corps team. There had not
been enough Marines on the helicopters to process evacuees efficiently and provide
adequate security as well.107 This had motivated Oats to request the forty-four addi-
tional Marines. He did not want to weaken perimeter security by using McAleer’s
Marines in the ECC but eventually felt it necessary to do so. The final decision not to
send more troops into Mogadishu forced Bishop, Oats, and the other hard-pressed
Americans to complete their tasks with the personnel on hand.108 Doyle realized
that Oats’s job was difficult, but absent a concerted effort to storm the embassy he
felt another high-risk insertion flight could not be justified.109
Conditions worsened throughout Mogadishu, and consular representatives
from numerous nations sought refuge in and evacuation through the American
embassy. Bishop at first required foreign nationals to make their own ways to the
embassy, but when the Soviet ambassador declared that he and his remaining
staff would require assistance, Bishop agreed to escort them with permanent
embassy security personnel. To augment this force he contracted the Somali po-
lice, under a Major Sayed, who agreed to support the effort for a fee. The ambas-
sador used a similar approach in escorting members of the British mission into
the American embassy.110 On one occasion, a team of Marines, SEALs, and em-
bassy security personnel ventured into Mogadishu in hardened vehicles to res-
cue twenty-two people from the Office of Military Cooperation and return
them safely to the embassy grounds.111 The twenty-two included Colonel David
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Stanley, the chief of the office, along with the ambassador from Kenya and mem-
bers of his family and staff.112
The understaffed ECC established by Saunders on the embassy grounds
worked hard to identify and process evacuees under difficult circumstances.
Since augmentation of the evacuation force had been denied, Oats utilized
members of the embassy staff along with, as noted, some of McAleer’s Marines
to provide administrative help (checking identities, screening potential evacu-
ees, creating manifests, etc.), as best they could. Although ultimately successful,
the preparation of evacuees for movement out of Mogadishu fell far short of
ideal, causing problems at the departure site and aboard the ships—particularly
in identifying and accounting for authorized evacuees.113 As the Marines within
the embassy struggled with their problems, the officers and crews of Guam and
Trenton began addressing the needs of evacuees. This included establishing a
medical triage station, arranging berthing for both genders, caring for children,
protecting individual property, accounting for evacuees by nationality and sta-
tus, and providing food and clothing, while at the same time supporting opera-
tions ashore.114
As night approached on 5 January, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters—
flying in four waves of five aircraft each—commenced evacuation operation off
the decks of Guam, now positioned approximately thirty miles at sea. To mini-
mize the risk of hostile fire, all evacuation flights by the Sea Knight helicopters
occurred at night, with the embassy compound darkened. The Marine pilots
and infantrymen used night-vision devices.115 Even with such equipment flight
operations at night in an uncertain environment can be very dangerous, but the
Marines believed they had better control of these complications than they would
have had over the hostile elements that freely operated during daylight.116 The
evacuation started smoothly until Major Sayed, who had earlier assisted in the
transportation of foreign consular personnel into the American embassy, sud-
denly arrived with two trucks full of soldiers. Carrying a radio and hand gre-
nade, Sayed demanded that the evacuation cease immediately—his government
had not approved the flights.117 Bishop and Oats refused to halt the operations,
and the ambassador ultimately persuaded the Somali officer not to interfere.118
Bishop accomplished this through skillful negotiation, the help of several thou-
sand dollars, and the keys to an embassy automobile of Sayed’s choice. In the
process, Bishop managed to take possession of the major’s radio, to prevent him
from calling antiaircraft fire on the departing helicopters.119
This incident created some confusion in the last evacuation waves, because
Bishop insisted on remaining in the compound so as to be available to handle
such problems through the end of the evacuation. He and his security team had
been scheduled to depart in the third wave, but his decision to remain to the end
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meant that only four helicopters on the third wave were full and departed as
planned. The fifth helicopter remained on the ground until the arrival of the
fourth wave. Having an extra helicopter in the final wave created confusion,
causing inaccuracies in the serial manifests and the helicopter loading plan. That
confusion in turn nearly resulted in a small communications team’s missing the
last flight out of Mogadishu (the crew chief on one of the Sea Knights spotted
the Marines and placed them aboard his aircraft).120 Ultimately, all personnel
approved or designated for evacuation, including the entire NEO force, de-
parted safely and arrived on board Guam or Trenton.121 As the last helicopter de-
parted, a large mob entered the embassy grounds, looting and destroying
everything in sight. Well before sunrise on 6 January 1991, the last Sea Knight set
down on the deck of Guam and Ambassador Bishop declared the evacuation
complete.122
The final evacuation flight occurred without the support of the AC-130, be-
cause the gunship had detected a radar of the type associated with a Soviet-built
SA-2 surface-to-air missile site tracking it and had moved off station. The pres-
ence of SA-2 missiles confirmed the commanders’ concerns about the presence
of sophisticated weapons in Somalia. The SA-2 posed a definite threat to the
AC-130 aircraft, but Doyle had not been concerned for the CH-46 helicopters,
because he believed they would fly too low to be tracked by its radars.123
The amphibious evacuation in Mogadishu ultimately extracted 281 people,
including sixty-one Americans, thirty-nine Soviet citizens, seventeen British
citizens, twenty-six Germans, and various numbers from twenty-eight other na-
tions.124 This included twelve heads of diplomatic missions—eight ambassadors
and four chargés d’affaires. Unfortunately, Bishop had determined that none of
the many Somali foreign service nationals in the embassy compound could be
evacuated, although they had remained loyal. Bishop did not even have enough
cash to pay all their wages due. Though they faced an uncertain future, the So-
malis accepted their fate, remained on their job to the end, and never attempted
to rush the helicopters or create serious problems for the evacuation effort.125
The influx of civilians on Guam and Trenton severely taxed their resources
and ability to provide support, of course. But Saffell described the response of
the sailors and Marines as “awesome,” noting that they gladly gave berthing
space and personal items to ease the plight of the evacuees.126 Additionally, the
Guam’s medical staff treated one evacuee with an abdominal gunshot wound
and another with a knife wound.127 Also, the Sudanese ambassador’s wife gave
birth to a baby boy on board Guam. (In keeping with an old Navy tradition, the
lad’s name was engraved on the inside of the ship’s bell.)128
On 11 January Trenton and Guam off-loaded their passengers in Muscat,
Oman, without fanfare and resumed their duties in support of DESERT SHIELD
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and DESERT STORM. Bishop had wanted the evacuees transported to Mombasa,
but Schwarzkopf ordered the ships back into the area of impending conflict in
the Gulf of Oman.129 Omani officials were at first reluctant to accept the refu-
gees, but stellar work by the American ambassador in Oman persuaded them to
do so. Before taking leave of the sailors and Marines, Ambassador Bishop praised
their competence and professionalism, concluding his remarks by saying, “Few
of us would have been alive today if we had been outside your reach. It was only
due to your efforts that we made it.”130
In many ways, EASTERN EXIT is a textbook example of how to conduct an am-
phibious evacuation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, Gen-
eral Alfred Gray, referred to it as a “very complex and somewhat dangerous
mission.”131 Gray should know about complex and dangerous NEOs, since he
played a prominent role in the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975.132 Although
Gray also called the mission “flawless,” many problems arose throughout the ac-
tion. But the professionalism of Marines and sailors overcame those obstacles
with solutions sufficient to ensure success.133 The operation demonstrated that
the amphibious capability of the United States could respond to nearly any exi-
gency virtually anywhere in the world, even when distracted by larger and more
important missions, such as DESERT SHIELD and the upcoming DESERT STORM.
Navy and Marine Corps leaders considered EASTERN EXIT a demonstration of
the excellence of the sea services and an example of the value of amphibious ca-
pability within the expeditionary environment. The operation also demon-
strated that modern amphibious actions depend as much on aviation assets—
particularly helicopters—as on traditional surface landing vehicles. This is not
surprising, considering that the U.S. Marine Corps pioneered the military use of
helicopters for a variety of applications, including vertical assault during the Ko-
rean War.134
As part of the complete revision of Marine Corps doctrine that occurred dur-
ing the second half of the 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant from
1995 to 1999, used EASTERN EXIT as a case study for understanding and imple-
menting expeditionary concepts in the emerging new world order.135 More im-
portant, EASTERN EXIT made clear that the professional Navy and Marine Corps
team that had matured over several hundred years continued to provide Ameri-
can political and diplomatic leaders with a range of military options unknown
anywhere else in the world, or at any other time in history.136 The commitment
of forces to EASTERN EXIT had no impact on the subsequent war with Iraq. After
off-loading the evacuees in Oman, the entire task force returned to normal duty
and fully participated in SEA SOLDIER IV, the important final workup for DESERT
STORM.137 As subsequent events showed, Schwarzkopf ’s air and ground war
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proved sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces—with a little help from the
amphibious feint of LaPlante and Jenkins. The ability to move seamlessly from
DESERT SHIELD to EASTERN EXIT to SEA SOLDIER IV and on to DESERT STORM
clearly illustrates the capabilities needed to implement the operational and stra-
tegic concepts espoused in “. . . From the Sea” and “Operational Maneuver from
the Sea.”
EASTERN EXIT received little press coverage due to the larger events of
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, yet many in the Department of Defense ap-
preciated its significance. Not only did the Marine Corps include it as a case
study in subsequent doctrinal publications, but the Navy also mentioned it in
Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.138 Captain Moser assisted in the
lessons-learned process by preparing an instructional seminar that became part
of the curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College, in Norfolk, Virginia.139
Lieutenant Colonel McAleer also created a briefing, which he presented to the
Landing Force Training Commands at the amphibious bases in Little Creek, Vir-
ginia, and Coronado, California.140 More notably, he briefed the material to Cap-
tain Braden J. Phillips, Colonel Michael W. Hagee, and the 11th MEU (SOC)
staff during their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton, California. As
commanders of Amphibious Squadron 1 and 11th MEU (SOC), respectively,
Phillips and Hagee led the next Navy and Marine Corps team to implement the
precepts of “. . . From the Sea.” In August 1992, the United States returned to So-
malia to assist in humanitarian relief during operation PROVIDE RELIEF—a pre-
cursor to Operation RESTORE HOPE. That September, the PHIBRON 1 and 11th
MEU (SOC) team deployed to the Indian Ocean and returned to the Horn of Af-
rica as the United States attempted to help a nation in crisis.141
After the American evacuation of its embassy in Mogadishu, conditions had
continued to deteriorate in Somalia. To some extent, the large quantities of
weapons and ammunition previously supplied by the Soviet Union and later by
the United States fueled the fighting. As rebel factions gained ground against
Siad Barre, they often captured armories and munitions supply centers with
which to arm their forces and allies.142 By late January 1991—about two weeks
after the evacuation and just as General Schwarzkopf began the air operations
phase of DESERT STORM—forces under Mohamed Farah Aideed drove Siad
Barre from Mogadishu and, by May 1992, into exile in Kenya and Nigeria. Al-
though many factors contributed to the defeat of Siad Barre and the collapse of
his rule, Aideed was largely responsible for the final victory. He not only drove
Siad Barre out of Somalia but also defeated his three subsequent efforts to regain
control. Aideed believed this success earned him the right to lead the nation, but
other warlords disagreed. The clans could not unite to form a new government;
warfare continued, and chaotic conditions persisted. The extreme violence
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made food distribution difficult, creating critical shortages in many parts of So-
malia. Reports fostered an impression of widespread starvation, causing the
United Nations to request international intervention to alleviate suffering and
restore order. It was for this reason that, a year and a half after EASTERN EXIT,
American naval expeditionary forces would return to Somalia and once again
apply the concepts of “. . . From the Sea.”143
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